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Abstract 
Really simple syndication (RSS) technology enables an alternative delivery mechanism for online 
content. Instead of waiting passively for users to pull online content out, websites can push it to potential 
users through RSS. This is expected to significantly affect user behavior, website profitability, and market 
equilibrium. This research uses an economic model to study the impact of RSS adoption and examine 
whether it increases a website’s profit and competitive advantage. The findings are intriguing: they 
demonstrate that RSS can either increase or decrease website profit. In a competitive context, RSS 
adoption can actually be a disadvantage; in some cases, it hurts the adopter but benefits the competitor. 
Moreover, under certain conditions, the first mover will be worse off when the competitor mimics its 
adoption decision, which discourages the earlier adoption and thus creates an obstacle to using RSS. 
Derivation of the adoption equilibria in sequential and simultaneous games shows that multiple market 
outcomes may result. Finally, regardless of whether or not a website operator adopts RSS, it will still 
benefit by increasing user awareness of RSS technology, but only up to a certain level. Once this critical 
awareness level has been reached, websites will not gain by continuing to promote RSS to users. As a 
whole, these results show how technology adoption will have an impact on firm performance and market 
outcome, and illustrate the complexity of technology adoption strategy in a competitive setting. 
Key words and phrases: competition, e-commerce, game theory, information economics, online content 
delivery, RSS 
 
The Internet is a major platform for information acquisition and distribution to users across the world. As 
online content grows in amount, size, and complexity, users face information overload [23, 31]. It 
becomes increasingly difficult to locate and access desired information through the conventional pull 
method, in which users locate information by performing a search. Web searches are costly [42], taking 
time and effort, which can range from personally surfing the Internet to using independent agents. Also, 
during the search process, users bear the additional costs of downloading and viewing online 
advertisements. Web advertisements—especially large ads with text, graphics, music, or videos—require 
greater effort to view. Under the conventional pull method, websites are passive. They wait for users to 
find and visit them by searching, and then initiate the consumption of online content. It is difficult for a 
website to distinguish itself from competitors who provide the same content and services and adopt 
similar selling strategies. The conventional pull method, therefore, is inefficient for web content delivery 
and unsatisfactory on both the supply or website and demand or user sides. 
Many websites have started to use the push method, enabled by really simple syndication (RSS) 
technology, to deliver content. As its name suggests, RSS is easy to use. Websites attach RSS feeds to 
their online content, and users install on their computers an RSS reader, a downloadable software 
program. 1 The RSS reader periodically searches RSS feeds, checks for updates, and sends text abstracts, 
summaries, headlines, and so forth, as well as a link to the user to the full text [10, 19]. The user is kept 
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up to date on content of interest, and can access the full information without performing a search. Most 
RSS readers can block online ads effectively, so that content of no interest and unwanted ads are filtered 
out [18]. 
RSS has spurred a move from the conventional pull method to the push method for online content 
delivery2.  The key difference between the two is who initiates delivery [19]. The pull method waits 
passively for users to access a website and its content; while the push method allows a website to actively 
create user demand for new information by periodically informing users of its availability [15]. I 
investigate how the push method affects user online behavior, influences website traffic and profitability, 
and changes the equilibrium in the marketplace. Using my findings, I provide practical RSS adoption 
strategies. 
Various types of websites have adopted RSS to reach potential Internet users. News portals have 
embraced the use of RSS. They allow users to access the latest updates of their favorite content—from 
economics, politics, and science, to sports and entertainment—without a lengthy search [10, 35]. Most 
consumer media websites have been providing content via RSS feeds, including established outlets such 
as the BBC, CNN, and the New York Times [9].3  E-commerce websites have also started using RSS to 
inform potential consumers of new arrivals and sales. For example, Orbitz launched its RSS collection in 
2006. Its feeds update users about new bargains on flights, hotels, and rental cars. eBay, which has long 
enabled users to save their search terms and opt into daily e-mail summaries of new listings, recently 
redesigned its U.S. home page to include users’ saved searches in personalized feeds that update in real 
time [2]. In addition, RSS has been used in many innovative ways. Yahoo! for instance, uses My Yahoo 
Pages RSS feeds to enable users to create customized webpages, NewsGator and Netvibes offer mobile 
versions of their feed readers [22], financial institutions are reaching out to clients using RSS feeds [17], 
and many Twitter accounts receive tweets via RSS [36]. 
Although some industry data have demonstrated that providing an RSS feed attracts more visitors to a 
website,4 other reports have found that too much RSS traffic can trigger problems instead of profits for 
the website. For example, Robert McLaws, whose Longhorn Blogs was the first to test RSS ads for 
Google, said that 98 percent of the traffic on his site came from RSS feeds. He complained that RSS feeds 
are a “bandwidth killer,” and asserted that he was not able to monetize the website or cover server costs 
[26]. If this is commonly the case, does RSS add value to a website? Is RSS adoption always a good 
strategy? 
Google closed Google Reader, an RSS feed aggregator launched in 2005, in July 2013, based on 
declining use [3]. Analysis of Forrester Technographics data confirms Google’s claim: between 2008 and 
2012, the monthly percentage of U.S. online RSS users remained level at 10–11 percent [33].5 Although 
RSS has been welcomed and supported by most websites, it does not seem as attractive to Internet users. 
What causes this imbalance? Some analysts have found that most users who have not adopted RSS do not 
understand what it is, and the rest are not aware whether or not they use RSS. They believe that there is a 
large potential market for RSS to fill – but do websites have any incentive to educate users? 
To address these questions, I propose a game-theoretical model to investigate the following aspects of 
RSS adoption by websites and users. I ask: Who actually benefits from RSS use? Will RSS feeds bring 
more traffic and higher profit to a website in a competitive marketplace? Does a first-adopter advantage 
exist for websites? What are the equilibria in both sequential and simultaneous adoption games, and what 
key factors determine the equilibrium outcome? What are the recommended adoption strategies for a 
website when competing with another website that has or has not used RSS? How will users’ RSS-
awareness rate affect websites? Do websites have an incentive to invest in boosting users’ RSS-
awareness? 
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Almost all research about RSS so far have focused on those technical issues. For example, Blekas, 
Garofalakis, and Stefanis [2] and Garofalakis and Stefanis [11] examine the use of RSS feeds for effective 
mobile web browsing. Ning, Jin, and Wu [29] present RSS as a framework that enables ranked searches 
on the semantic web. Glotzbach, Mohler, and Radwan [13] describe RSS as a creative method of 
distributing and delivering course information. And Li and Wu [24] discuss RSS use in libraries. Ma [27] 
is the only exception that studied RSS adoption as a business strategy but it was mainly from one firm's 
perspective without considering competition equilibrium. In contrast to previous work, I examine RSS 
from an economic perspective and view RSS adoption as a competitive strategy for reaching potential 
online users and increasing a website’s competitive capability. 
Technology adoption will typically have an impact on firm strategy [14, 39]. Will benefits outweigh 
costs, in a competitive setting, when a new technology and related business strategy are employed? 
Previous work has shown that there are no absolutes. One example is third-party software add-ins: 
Although add-ins enhance the base product’s functionality, they may also decrease the base software 
producer’s profit [7]. Another example is the online customization strategy, which could be used as a 
price-discrimination tool for sellers to gain higher profit. Yet Dewan, Jing, and Seidmann [6] show that in 
a duopoly adoption game, firms face the two competing firms face a prisoner’s dilemma. In a competitive 
market, it is not always optimal to adopt a customization strategy. To answer for RSS, I investigate RSS 
adoption strategy. 
Offering RSS feeds introduces an alternative channel for web visits—but how does it compete with the 
conventional pull method of visiting a website? Channel competition [1, 12, 32] and product-line 
cannibalization have been documented in many scenarios. In some, coexistence of multiple delivery 
channels or multiple quality-differentiated products has a cannibalization effect [34, 37], leading to lower 
profits for the provider. Does cannibalization also arise between pull and push methods? I investigate this 
too. 
My findings are interesting. They show that in competition RSS adoption will always bring more traffic 
to a website, but not necessarily higher profit, suggesting the existence of the cannibalization effect. 
Further, in certain circumstances, RSS adoption hurts the adopter but benefits the competitor. And in a 
sequential adoption setting, a website may find it not optimal to be the first adopter—when its competitor 
follows and adopts RSS at a later time, the first adopter gets hurt—and thus the website should choose not 
to adopt as a way to protect itself in the competition. These findings illustrate the complexity of RSS 
adoption strategy in a competitive context. I also derive adoption equilibria in both sequential and 
simultaneous games, and show that multiple market outcomes can result, depending on the expected 
revenue contribution from each RSS visitor. So I am able to discuss and suggest different adoption 
strategies. 
I find that all websites, regardless of whether they adopt RSS, will have an incentive to educate users 
about RSS. This incentive diminishes once users’ RSS-awareness level reaches a certain threshold 
though. My numerical analysis shows that a small percentage of RSS-aware users may be enough to 
support the market equilibrium; this could explain why users’ RSS adoption rate does not steadily 
increase. Finally, I relax my model assumptions to incorporate ongoing RSS practices such as RSS 
advertising. 
The Model 
Table 1 lists the parameters and variables used in the model and their definitions.  
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Table 1. Modeling Notation and Definitions 
  
The market consists of many users who are potential web visitors. Among the whole user population, β 
percentage of them are aware of RSS, and may use it if RSS feeds are provided. The rest, 1 – β 
percentage of users, have no knowledge of RSS. β measures users’ RSS-awareness level, and β < 1. 
A user wants to access specific online content that is of value b. Under the pull model, the user must log 
on, browse, and search through multiple web pages until he locates the targeted content and consumes it 
to get the value b. The website remains “silent” in this process; it passively waits for the user to pull 
information out of it. In my model, users who use the pull model to access online information are 
conventional visitors. When they browse, they have access to a large amount of information. Users have 
different attitudes: some enjoy surfing and obtain high value from it, whereas others know what they are 
interested in. 6 Meanwhile, web browsing also delivers online ads to users, which take time and effort to 
download and view. Dewan, Freimer, and Zhang [8] suggest that Internet users are always against ads, 
and that some may dislike ads more than others do. To capture these user differences, I assume that users’ 
net value from web browsing, including their gains from obtaining additional online information and their 
costs from viewing online ads, is heterogeneous, as denoted by x and follows a uniform distribution: x ~ 
U [0, a]. In addition, conventional visitors incur search cost S to search for and locate targeted content. 
They also incur disutility when the website is busy. Heavy traffic may cause problems such as slow 
delivery of web pages, deteriorated content quality, or delivery failure. These constitute users’ traffic 
costs wρ, where ρ is the total traffic load of the website and w is a constant. Finally, conventional visitors 
are assumed to pay pC to consume online content of interest. Their utility function can be written as UC = 
x + b – S – wρ – pC. 
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Alternatively, the website can use RSS feeds to push specific online content with value b to potential 
users. Under the push model, users click on the link sent to them by the RSS software and are taken to the 
targeted content immediately. Meanwhile, the RSS software will help to block most online ads. Users are 
able to skip the website browsing and searching process, while also avoiding the cost of viewing 
unwanted ads. Since these users do not browse the website as conventional visitors do, they will consume 
less online content. Their total payment for online content consumption is pR ≤ pC. These users are RSS 
visitors. Their utility function is UR = b – wρ – pR, with subscript R indicating RSS visitors. 
Let N, NC, and NR be the total number, respectively, of visitors, number of conventional visitors, and 
number of RSS visitors to a website, and N = NC + NR. Again, the subscript C is for conventional visitors 
and R for RSS visitors. Equation 1 gives the profit function of a website:  
π = A⋅Nc + pc⋅Nc + pR⋅NR − c⋅ρ. (1)  
The website’s revenue consists of two parts, online advertising revenue and content-sales revenue. 
First, the website gains advertising revenue (A · NC). 7 Conventional visitors, when searching and 
browsing the site, are exposed to a variety of online ads. The expected advertising revenue from an 
average conventional visitor is denoted by A. RSS visitors, however, do not contribute to online 
advertising revenue because they directly access the targeted content through the link provided in RSS 
feeds.8 First, I analyze the case of RSS feeds that are ad-free. 
Second, the website gains content-sales revenue (pC . NC + pR . NR).9 Conventional and RSS visitors will 
consume online content, but at different levels. Recall that pC is the expected content-sales revenue from a 
conventional visitor, pR is the expected content-sales revenue from an RSS visitor, and pC ≥ pR. 
The website bears site-maintenance costs cρ, where c is the unit maintenance cost and ρ is the effective 
traffic load of the website. Conventional and RSS visitors visit the website in distinct ways, and impose 
different levels of traffic load. Conventional visitors browse and search the site, downloading and visiting 
a number of web pages. I normalize the traffic load imposed by a conventional visitor to be 1. RSS 
visitors skip the search and view only pages with the targeted content. They impose less traffic load, 
which is assumed to be θ, θ < 1. So the website’s total effective traffic load can be written as:  
ρ = NC + θ NR. (2)  
Finally, I make Assumption 1: S + pc – a ≤ b ≤ S + pc + aω. If the right inequality is violated, the website 
will always attract all potential users, leading to a fully covered market; if the left inequality is violated, 
the website will get no visitors, leading to an empty market. 
Competitive Analysis 
In this section I analyze the competition between two websites, A and B. When websites take their 
respective content-delivery methods—to actively push online content to users via RSS or wait for users to 
pull content from them passively in the conventional way10.—there are four possible cases. 
Case <0,0>: Both Websites Do Not Offer RSS Feeds 
When RSS feeds are not offered, users must pull online content from websites. Figure 1 depicts the 
competitive market segmentation in Case <0,0>.  
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Figure 1. The Case <0,0> Market Segmentation 
 
As in Figure 1, the marginal user—who is indifferent between visiting a website or staying out of the 
market—is denoted by x<0,0>, where x<0,0> is his net value from web browsing, and the superscript is used 
to indicate Case <0,0>. This user gains zero utility from visiting a website; hence x<0,0> is given by:  
x <0,0> + b – pc – S − ω⋅ρi<0,0> = 0,i = AorB. (3)  
The superscript indicates the case and the subscript indicates websites (A or B) or visitors (C for 
conventional and R for RSS visitors). For example, ρA<0,0> is the traffic load of website A in Case <0,0>. 
Figure 1 shows that users in [x<0,0>, a], who gain higher net value from web browsing, will choose to visit 
a website (either A or B with equal probability); whereas users in [0, x<0,0>], who gain lower net value 
from web browsing, will not visit any website. It is easy to see that the two websites will have the same 
traffic load ρi<0,0> = (a − x<0,0>)/2, i=AorB in this case.11 Solving this problem yields:  
 Proposition 1 (No RSS Market Proposition). When both websites do not offer RSS feeds, the 
marginal user is at x(0,0) = . The traffic load, number of visitors, and profit for each 
website are , i=AorB. 
Case <1,0> and Case <0,1>: One Website Offers RSS Feeds and the Other Does Not 
These two cases are symmetric. Without loss of generality, I study Case <1,0>, in which website A adopts 
RSS whereas website B does not. Note that among the whole user population, only β percentage is aware 
of RSS technology. These users are called RSS-aware users, who may choose to access online content 
through RSS. In contrast, the rest—1 – β users—are RSS-unaware; when visiting a website, they always 
use the conventional pull method regardless of whether RSS feeds are available. I analyze RSS-aware and 
RSS-unaware users separately. Figure 2 depicts the competitive market outcome in this case.  
Figure 2. The Case <1,0> Market Segmentation 
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First, consider the choices of RSS-aware users. They must now decide whether to visit a website and, if 
so, which method (RSS or conventional) to use and which website (A or B) to visit. Figure (2a) 
demonstrates the final market segmentation among RSS-aware users. The RSS-aware user who is 
indifferent between the two visit methods is denoted by x<1,0>RSS-aware, and is given by:  
x<1,0>RSS−aware + b – pc – S − w⋅ρi<1,0> = b – pR −w.ρi<1,0>, (4)  
where the left side of the equation is the user’s utility from the conventional method and the right side is 
the utility from the RSS method. 
As Figure 2a shows, users whose net value from web browsing is larger than x<1,0>RSS−aware, namely, those 
located in [x<1,0>RSS-aware, a], are conventional visitors; there are β (a – x<1,0>RSS-aware) of them. Suppose that 
website A gets r percent of these conventional users and B gets 1 – r percent of them, where r is an 
endogenous value that needs to be solved in the model. Users whose net value from web browsing is 
smaller than x<1,0>RSS-aware, namely, those located in [0, x<1,0>RSS-aware], will either become RSS visitors (to 
website A) or simply stay out of the market. So, there are NR<1,0> RSS visitors in [0, x<1,0>RSS-aware], who 
visit website A; the rest, β (x<1,0>RSS-aware - NR<1,0>), stay out of the market. 
Next, consider the choices of RSS-unaware users. They will opt either to stay out of the market or to 
become conventional visitors. Figure 2b depicts the final market segmentation among RSS-unaware 
users. The one who is indifferent between visiting a website and not visiting any website at all is denoted 
by <x<1,0>RSS-unaware, and is given by: x<1,0> + b – pc – S – wρi = 0.   (5)  
Hence, there are (1 – β)(a – x<1,0>RSS-unaware) conventional visitors in [x<1,0>RSS-unaware, a]; r percent of them 
go to website A, and 1 – r go to website B. Users in [0, x<1,0>RSS-unaware] stay out of the market. 
The following set of equations characterizes the market outcome. 
ρB<1,0> = (1 – r){β(a − x<1,0>RSS-aware) + (1−β)(a − x<1,0>RSS-unaware)}   (6)  
ρA<1,0> = r {β(a − x<1,0>RSS-aware) + (1 − β)( a − x<1,0>RSS-unaware)} + θNR<1,0>   (7)  
b − pR − wρA<1,0> = 0             (8)  
0 ≤ NR <1,0> ≤ βx<1,0>RSS-aware   (9)  
Equations 6 and 7 show the effective traffic load for each website. Website B has only conventional 
visitors, either RSS-aware or RSS-unaware. Website A has both conventional visitors, each imposing one 
unit of traffic load, and RSS visitors, each imposing θ unit of traffic load.12 Equation 8 shows that in 
equilibrium, an RSS visitor gains zero utility.13 Equation 9 yields two boundary conditions: (1) 0 ≤ NR<1,0> 
states that there is a nonnegative number of RSS visitors, and (2) NR<1,0> ≤ βx<1,0>RSS-aware states that the 
number of RSS visitors is bounded by the number of RSS-aware users. Solving these equations gives:  
 Proposition 2 (One RSS Market Preposition). When only one website offers RSS:  
(1) The marginal user is at x<1,0> = S + pC − pR. Both websites have the same effective traffic load 
, i = AorB  
The website with RSS gets more visitors than the one without. 
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(2) The website with RSS gains higher profit than the one without, if and only if RSS visitors’ 
content-sales contribution is high enough: pR > p∗R = θ(A+pC). 
(3) This market outcome holds if and only if search costs for the conventional method are high, 
 and users’ RSS-awareness level is high, . 
See the Appendix for proofs of all of the main results in this article. 
This proposition describes the market outcome when only one website offers RSS, and identifies two 
necessary conditions for this outcome. The first inequality,  is called the 
nondegeneration condition. The violation of this condition, meaning that the search cost in the 
conventional visit method is too low, leads to the outcome that Case <1,0> degenerates to Case <0,0>. As 
a result, no user will choose to use the RSS method even if it is offered. The second inequality, 
, is called the critical awareness condition. If it is violated, the RSS-awareness 
among users is too low. As a result, the number of RSS visitors will be limited by the number of RSS-
aware users, and the stated market outcome is not valid.14  
When both conditions hold, this proposition reveals an interesting finding: the RSS adopter (website A) 
may gain higher or lower profit in competition with the nonadopter (website B). The adopter will gain 
higher profit than its nonadopter competitor if and only if RSS visitors are able to contribute enough 
content-sales revenue, exceeding a threshold value pR*. This suggests that the RSS use may not always 
add value for the adopter in a competitive setting, similar to what has been found in a monopoly setting 
[27]. 
Case <1,1>: Both Websites Offer RSS Feeds 
The final market segmentation, in which both websites provide RSS feeds, is shown in Figure 3. Again, 
the choices of RSS-aware and RSS-unaware users are analyzed separately.  
Figure 3. The Case <1,1> Market Segmentation 
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The RSS-aware user who is indifferent between the two methods is denoted by x<1,1>RSS-aware in Figure 3a, 
and is given by 
x<1,1>RSS-aware + b – pc – S − w⋅ρi<1,1> = b – pR − w⋅ρi<1,1>.      (10)  
Users in [x<1,1>RSS-aware, a] are conventional visitors, and there are β(a – x<1,1>RSS-aware) of them. Website A 
gets r1 percentage of these conventional users and B gets 1 – r1 percentage. Users in [0, x<1,1>RSS-aware] will 
either become RSS visitors or simply stay out of the market. There are NR<1,1> RSS visitors in [0, x<1,1>RSS-
aware], among which r2 percentage visit website A and 1 – r2 percentage visit website B. Here, the values 
of both r1 and r2 are endogenously determined. The rest, β(x<1,1>RSS-aware – NR<1,1>), stay out of the market. 
In Figure 3b, the RSS-unaware user who is indifferent between visiting a website or not is denoted by 
x<1,1>RSS-unaware, and is given by: 
x<1,1>RSS-unaware + b – pc – S − w⋅ρi<1,1> = 0.           (11)  
In total, there are (1 – β) (a – x<1,1>RSS-unaware) conventional visitors in [x<1,1>RSS-unaware, a]; r1 percentage of 
them visit A and 1 – r1 percentage visit B. Users in [0, x<1,1>RSS-unaware] choose to stay out of the market. 
The following set of equations characterizes the market outcome:  
ρA<1,1> = r1β(a − x<1,1>RSS-aware) + r1(1−β)(a − x<1,1>RSS-unaware) + θr2NR<1,1>     (12)  
ρB<1,1> = 1−r1β(a − x<1,1>RSS-aware)+1− r1 (1−β)( a − x<1,1>RSS-unaware)+θ(1− r2)NR<1,1>         13)  
b − pR − wρi<1,1> = 0                (14)  
0 ≤ NR<1,1> ≤ βx <1,1>RSS-aware        (15)  
These equations have meanings similar to Equations 6 to 9 in the Case <1,0>. Equations 12 and 13 are the 
effective traffic load for websites A and B. There are in total β(a – x<1,1>RSS-aware) + (1 – β) · (a – x<1,1>RSS-
unaware) conventional visitors; website A gets r1 percent and website B gets (1 – r1) percent. There are in 
total NR<1,1> RSS visitors; website A gets r2 percent and website B gets (1 – r2) percent. Equation 14 
shows that in equilibrium, an RSS visitor gains zero utility. Equation 15 gives the two boundary 
conditions. Solving Equations 10 to 15 yields:  
Proposition 3 (Both RSSs Market Prepostion). When both websites offer RSS feeds:  
(1) In the symmetric outcome, the marginal visitor is at x<1,1> S + pC – pR. Both websites get the same 
effective traffic load: ρA<1,1> = ρB<1,1> = (b – pR)/w. They also gain the same profit: 
, i=AorB. 
(2) This market outcome holds if and only if search costs in the conventional visit method are high, 
 and users’ RSS-awareness level is high,  
Proposition 3 states the Case <1,1> outcome and the nondegeneration and critical awareness conditions 
to support it. The two conditions are that the RSS-awareness level among users must exceed a critical 
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threshold, and search cost in the conventional method must be high enough. Although Proposition 3 
addresses only symmetric outcomes, I have shown that asymmetric conditions can also exist; and the 
existence conditions have been derived in the Appendix. 
RSS Adoption Equilibrium Analysis 
So far, I have analyzed four possible cases—namely, both websites do not adopt Case <0,0>, only one 
website adopts Case <0,1> or <1,0>, and both websites adopt Case <1,1>. In the competition, a website’s 
RSS adoption decision must be strategic: it must expect the competitor’s response, and the interaction 
between the two websites will determine the market equilibrium. The four cases may or may not appear 
as the equilibrium outcomes. Analyzing them is meaningful because it serves as a stepping-stone to the 
final equilibrium to explain the rationale of why one case is the equilibrium outcome and another is not. 
I will next study websites’ strategic adoption decisions. I will consider both sequential and simultaneous 
adoption, identifying and assessing different equilibrium outcomes. My analyses will focus on scenarios 
in which the nondegeneration condition and critical awareness condition in Propositions 2 and 3 hold.15. 
In addition, for Case <1,1>, I will use the symmetric market outcome as stated in Proposition 3. 
Sequential RSS Adoption 
Next, I study websites’ sequential adoption decision. The two websites decide to adopt or not adopt RSS 
in a sequential order. Without loss of generality, let website A be the first decision maker and B be the 
second. The sequential decision tree is presented in Figure 4. 
Figure 4. Decision Tree and Payoffs for Sequential Adoption 
 
When a website adopts RSS feeds before its competitor, we call it the first RSS adoption; when a website 
adopts RSS feeds after its competitor, we call it the second RSS adoption. Before presenting the 
sequential equilibrium, I study the effects of first and second RSS adoption. I assert Lemma 1, which 
shows the comparison results for website traffic load, the number of visitors, and the number of 
conventional and RSS visitors across different cases.  
 Lemma 1 (Comparison Results for Website Traffic). The results are: (1) Website traffic load 
ρi<0,0> < ρA<1,0> = ρB<1,0> =ρi<1,1>, i=AorB; (2) the total number of visitors Ni<0,0> < NA<1,0> < Ni<1,1> < 
NA<1,0>, i=AorB; and (3) the number of conventional visitors: NC,A<1,0> < NC,i<1,1> < NC,i<0,0> < 
NC,B<1,0>, i=AorB. 
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The way to read Lemma 1 is via Table 2, which shows changes after the first and second RSS adoption.  
Table 2. Impact of First and Second RSS Adoption 
 
In Table 2, the website that adopts RSS is called the adopting website, and the other is called the 
competing website. The sign “+” indicates an increase after adoption, “–” indicates a decrease, and “none” 
indicates no change. As Table 2 shows, the first RSS adoption always brings in more traffic load for both 
the adopter and its competitor, while the second RSS adoption has no impact on either website’s traffic 
level. The results for changes in the number of total and conventional visitors are intuitive. The first RSS 
adoption increases the market size for both websites, whereas the second RSS adoption increases the 
adopter’s market size but decreases the competitor’s market size. Both the first and second adoptions 
always decrease the number of conventional visitors to the adopting website and increase the number of 
conventional visitors to the competing website. 
For websites’ profit change after the RSS adoption though, I find there is no definite answer: it can 
increase or decrease, depending on pR, the expected content-sales revenue per RSS visitor. So I offer:  
 Proposition 4 (Impact of os Adoption Proposition). There are two critical values for the 
expected content-sales revenue per RSS visitor, denoted by pR
1 and pR
2, and pR
1 < pR
2.  
(1) Impact of the first RSS adoption is as follows. If pR > pR
1, the adopting website’s profit 
increases; if pR < pR
1, the adopting website’s profit decreases. On the other hand, the competing 
website’s profit always increases. 
(2) The impact of second RSS adoption is as follows. If pR > pR
2, the adopting website’s profit 
increases but the competing website’s profit decreases; if pR < pR
2, the adopting website’s profit 
decreases but the competing website’s profit increases. 
The last column in Table 2 summarizes this proposition. The main conclusion is interesting. Adopting 
RSS technology in a competitive setting, whether as the first adopter or second follower, may not enhance 
the website’s profits. The first adoption may increase or decrease the adopting website’s profit, but will 
always increase the competing website’s profit; the second adoption will have the opposite effect on the 
adopting and competing websites. It will always increase the profit of one website while decreasing the 
profit of the other, which puts the two websites in a conflict of interest position. Specifically, I highlight 
several cases in which RSS adoption may decrease the adopter’s profit while increasing its competitor’s 
profit. For example, when pR < pR1, the first RSS adoption will hurt the adopter but benefit the competitor. 
Another example is that when pR < pR2, the second RSS adoption will also hurt the adopter but benefit its 
competitor. In both examples, the beneficiary of the RSS is the competitor, not the adopter. 
Table 2 shows what will happen to the competition outcome if a website adopts RSS. This analysis helps 
the website to assess the impact of its actions and make a rational adoption decision, which will 
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eventually lead to the adoption equilibrium. To complete the analysis, I now derive the equilibrium 
outcomes in the sequential setting. Without loss of generality, website A is assumed to be the first 
decision maker and B the second, consistent with the decision tree in Figure 4, and I offer:  
 Proposition 5 (Sequential Equilibrium Proposition). In a sequential adoption game in which 
website A moves before B, the equilibrium outcome depends on pR, the expected content-sales 
revenue contribution of an RSS visitor.  
(1) If pR < pR
1, the equilibrium is <0,0> and both websites do not adopt; 
(2) If pR
1 < pR < pR
2, the equilibrium is <0,1>, then website A does not adopt but B adopts; 
(3) If pR >pR
2, the equilibrium is <1,1> and both websites adopt. 
The two critical values, pR1 and pR2, are defined in the Impact of Adoption Proposition (Proposition 4), 
and pR1 < pR2. The Sequential Equilibrium Proposition (Proposition 5) is depicted in Figure 5.  
Figure 5. Sequential Adoption Equilibrium 
 
The interesting finding here is that, in a sequential adoption game, the market outcome <1,0> will never 
be the equilibrium. Why? This is because when pR < pR2, a website will always be worse off if it acts as 
the first RSS adopter: In the range of pR < pR1, RSS adoption will reduce the adopting website’s profit 
instead of increasing it. In the range of pR1 < pR < pR2 though, the first adopter’s profit will be reduced by 
the competitor’s subsequent adoption. As a result, the website will choose not to be the first adoptor and 
thereby protects itself in a sequential game, leading to the equilibrium <0,0> when pR < pR1 and 
equilibrium <0,1> when pR1 < pR < pR2. 
Simultaneous RSS Adoption 
Here, I study websites’ simultaneous adoption decisions.16 The following proposition shows that multiple 
equilibria exist in the simultaneous game; which one to emerge will depend on pR, which is the expected 
content-sales revenue contribution of an RSS visitor:  
 Proposition 6 (Simultaneous Equilibrium Proposition). In a simultaneous adoption game, the 
equilibrium outcome depends on pR, the expected content-sales revenue contribution of an RSS 
visitor.  
(1) If pR < pR1, the equilibrium is <0,0> and both websites do not adopt; 
(2) If pR1 < pR < pR2, the equilibrium is <0,1> or <1,0>, one website adopts but the other does not; 
(3) If pR > pR2, the equilibrium is <1,1>, and both websites adopt. 
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Different simultaneous equilibria are demonstrated in Figure 6. The two critical values, pR1 and pR2, are 
defined in the Impact of Adoption Proposition (Proposition 4).17 In general, my finding shows that when 
pR increases, a website’s incentive to adopt RSS increases. Under a large value of pR (pR > pR2), the <1,1> 
equilibrium—that is, both websites adopt—is more likely. Under a small value of pR (pR < pR1), the <0,0> 
equilibrium—that is, neither adopts—is expected. These findings are the same as those in a sequential 
adoption setting. When pR is in the middle range (pR1 < pR < pR2), however, the outcomes are different. In 
the simultaneous equilibrium, it will be either <1,0> or <0,1>, with an equal chance for either to appear. 
In the sequential equilibrium, however, the first decision maker—namely, website A—will always choose 
not to adopt, leading to the <0,1> equilibrium. Note that pR < pR2 suggests pR < pR*, where pR* is the 
critical value defined in the One RSS Market Proposition (Proposition 2). Hence, in this equilibrium 
<0,1>, website A, the nonadopter, always gains higher profit than website B, the adopter. (See 
Proposition 2.)  
Figure 6. Simultaneous Adoption Equilibrium 
 
I derived all of the equilibria in the sequential and simultaneous adoption settings. Now I ask: in any 
equilibrium outcome, will the RSS technology benefit both websites, compared to the benchmark when 
RSS is not available at all? Or is it possible that the benefits of RSS, in the competition, might be 
captured by one website solely at the cost of the other? The next proposition offers my answer:  
 Proposition 7. (Benefits of RSS Proposition). In equilibrium, regardless of whether it adopts 
RSS, a website benefits from the RSS technology. In certain scenarios, the greatest profit 
improvement does not go to the adopting website, but rather to its competitor. 
The proposition suggests that, when RSS is available, a website is always better off, even if it may not use 
RSS in equilibrium. The following numerical example demonstrates this result graphically. Figure 7 
depicts the equilibrium profits. The x-axis has the values of pR. The value range in which the 
nondegeneration conditions are satisfied is: pR ∈ [1.3, 2.6], calculated using the One RSS Market 
Proposition (Proposition 2) and Both RSSs Market Proposition (Proposition 3). I also indicate the two 
threshold values: pR1 = 1.6 and pR2 = 2, calculated using the Impact of Adoption Proposition (Proposition 
4). They result in four ranges: (1) for pR ∈ [1.3, 1.6], the equilibrium is <0,0> for both sequential and 
simultaneous games; (2) for pR ∈ [1.6, 2], the equilibrium is <0,1> for the sequential game, and <0,1> or 
<1,0> for the simultaneous game; (3) for pR ∈ [2, 2.6], the equilibrium is <1,1> for both sequential and 
simultaneous games; and (4) for pR > 2.6, the nondegeneration condition is violated and the market 
outcome falls back to <0,0>. There are three lines: lines 1 and 3 are the profits of website A and B in the 
sequential equilibrium respectively, where website A is the first decision maker in the game; line 2 is a 
website’s profit in the simultaneous equilibrium. These three lines are always above the benchmark profit 
line that is the horizontal straight line around the value 8.85. This suggests that when one or two websites 
adopts RSS, both are expected to get higher profits than what they obtain in the benchmark without the 
RSS technology.  
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Figure 7. Equilibrium Profit Comparison 
 
Notes: The parameter values used in this example are: b = 8; a = 10; S = 5; pC = 4; w = 3; A = 1; c = 0.1; θ 
= 0.4. 
 
In addition, the three lines overlap each other in Ranges 1, 3, and 4. In Range 2,18 however, I show that 
line 1 > line 2 > line 3, meaning that “the profit of website A in the sequential game” > “the profit of a 
website in the simultaneous game” > “the profit of website B in the sequential game.” Note that in this 
case, website A’s strategy in the sequential game is not to adopt. This, as I pointed out, is because website 
A knows that if it adopts now, it will be hurt by its competitor’s sequential adoption at a later time. As a 
result, A chooses not to be the first adopter, which protects it from the competitor’s later action. In this 
scenario, nonadopter A’s profit is improved more than adopter B’s. 
RSS-Awareness Level Analysis 
In the analysis so far, the RSS critical awareness condition is required. Only when users’ RSS-awareness 
level is higher than the critical value   will market outcomes for Cases 
<1,0> and <1,1> hold, as stated in the One RSS Market Proposition (Proposition 2) and Both RSSs 
Market Proposition (Proposition 3). What will happen if RSS-awareness is lower than β*? How will a 
website’s profit be affected by the value of β in general? And do websites have any incentive to invest in 
educating users about RSS technology and therefore increase β? If so, to what level? I answer these 
questions by extending my analysis to the scenario in which only a small number of users know about 
RSS, that is, a market with a low RSS-awareness level β. 
I investigate Cases <1,0> and <1,1> when β < β*. I reanalyze the market segmentation, recalculate the 
number of RSS and conventional visitors to each website, and rederive the equilibrium profit of each 
website. I established these following analytical results. (See Lemma 2 and its proof in the Appendix.) (1) 
When β = 0, the market equilibrium is <0,0>. This occurs even if RSS is available, but no one will use it 
because no user will know about its existence. (2) When β ∈ (0, β*), a website’s equilibrium profit is a 
complex function of β. (3) When β ≥ β*, a website’s equilibrium profit is not a function of β. (See the 
proof of Propositions 2 and 3.) And finally, (4) in any equilibrium j (j = <0,1>, <1,0> or <1,1>), for any 
website i (i = A or B): πi
j(β*) > πi
j(β = 0). (See the proof of Proposition 7.) 
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Based on these findings, I conclude that in the range β ∈ (0, β*], there must be a value, denoted by βopti, 
which optimizes the website’s profit. This value βopti is the optimal RSS-awareness level, in the sense that 
a website, regardless of whether it offers RSS in the equilibrium, has an incentive to invest and help boost 
users’ RSS-awareness up to βopti. Beyond βopti, the website is no longer interested in doing this. 
To demonstrate how the website’s equilibrium profit varies in β, and also to calculate βopti, I rely on 
numerical analysis. When setting parameter values, there are some “rules” to follow. First, the parameter 
values of {S, a, b, w, pC} must satisfy S + pC – a ≤ b ≤ S + pC + aw. This is to ensure that Assumption 1 is 
satisfied. Second, the value of pR must satisfy the nondegeneration conditions specified in Propositions 2 
and 3. In addition, for every set of parameters, I need to calculate the two threshold values pR1 and pR2 
using Proposition 4, as well as the critical value β* using Propositions 2 and 3. Figure 8 shows the results 
from one numerical example, which takes parameter values the same as in Figure 7. Figure 8a shows the 
two websites’ profits in the <1,0> equilibrium when pR1 < pR < pR2, and Figure 8b shows their profits in 
the <1,1> equilibrium when pR > pR2.19   In addition, the critical RSS-awareness level β* is also 
highlighted in the figures: β* = 0.411 in the <1,0> equilibrium and β* = 0.126 in the <1,1> equilibrium. 
A website reaches its highest profit at β*, suggesting βopti = β*, regardless of whether it adopts RSS in 
equilibrium. So both websites have an incentive to invest in educating users about RSS until the critical 
RSS-awareness level β*. More numerical analyses with different parameter input values showed that the 
profit function may have different forms in [0, β*]—linearly or nonlinearly increasing, or first decreasing 
and then increasing in β. The result βopti = β* always seems to hold though. 
These results may explain the discrepancy between websites’ and users’ RSS adoption rates. More than 
half of the websites today provide RSS feeds, while RSS adoption among users is much lower. It has 
remained at around 10 percent for the past five years [33]. Why do RSS adoption levels for the two sides 
not match each other? Should websites exert effort to educate Internet users about RSS? My results 
provide a possible answer. Users’ RSS-awareness level does not matter, as long as it exceeds a critical 
level. Especially when pR is high, the required awareness level β* among users can be very small. For 
example, in Figure 8b, β* is only 12.6 percent, so only a small group of users (12.6 percent) with RSS-
awareness will be good enough to support the market equilibrium <1,1>, in which both websites will 
adopt RSS. Once this 12.6 percent awareness level is reached, websites will not expend effort to promote 
RSS to users. 
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Figure 8. Website’s Profit Versus Users’ RSS-Awareness Level 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The use of RSS feeds on the Internet is an interesting problem to study. Currently, many websites have 
adopted RSS as a delivery mechanism to actively push online content to potential users, offering them an 
alternative way to visit websites. Use of RSS is expected to have an impact on both websites and users. 
My research goal has been twofold. First, I examined the economic impact of RSS adoption on websites 
in a duopoly market. I studied how RSS adoption by one website, both as first and second adopter, can 
affect traffic load and profits for both the website and its competitor. I analyzed the market equilibria in 
both sequential and simultaneous adoption scenarios. Second, I investigated changes in user website visit 
behavior after a website’s RSS adoption. When RSS feeds are available, who will use them and who will 
continue to use the conventional pull method? Are RSS-aware and RSS-unaware users affected 
differently? What is the role of the users’ RSS-awareness level, and should websites expend effort to 
educate users about RSS technology? I constructed a model to develop answers. 
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My results demonstrate the compound effect of technology adoption on firm performance and market 
outcome in a competitive marketplace. Multiple lessons are learned, not only about RSS but also about 
other types of technology adoptions. For example, the firm must understand that a larger market share 
will not always lead to a higher profit. The resulting increased costs may outweigh the gains from the 
market expansion, making the adoption unprofitable. Also, the first mover will inevitably face the threat 
of being copied by a competing follower at a later time, especially when the adoption barrier is low. It is 
therefore important that a firm’s adoption decision should be evaluated from a market perspective by 
taking the competitor’s behavior into account. Adoption timing is critical. Finally, it is worth investing in 
users’ technology awareness level as a preparatory step toward a successful adoption. 
Discussion of the Major Results and Their Implications 
My results highlight the complexity of a website’s RSS adoption decision. For example, I showed that 
under certain conditions, RSS adoption can negatively affect a website’s profits. In some scenarios, 
higher traffic brought on by RSS was accompanied by lower profits. A more interesting finding was that, 
in a competitive setting, a website’s RSS adoption decision can lead to an increase in profits for the 
competitor and, at the same time, a decrease in its own profits. The beneficiary of the RSS technology 
becomes the competitor rather than the adopter, and RSS, rather than offering a competitive advantage, 
becomes a disadvantage. A website may find itself at a disadvantage if it adopts RSS earlier than its 
competitor because its profits will be reduced if, later on, the competitor also adopts RSS. In this scenario, 
both websites will choose not to adopt but rather to wait, leading to the equilibrium that no one uses RSS. 
Finally, I showed that different equilibria can arise in sequential and simultaneous adoption settings, 
depending on expected content-sales revenue per RSS visitor. So we may not see unanimous adoption 
among websites. 
My results also reveal that websites have an incentive to boost RSS-awareness among Internet users, but 
only up to a certain level. I identified a critical RSS-awareness level. Before the level is reached, a 
website will benefit from the increasing number of users who understand RSS, regardless of whether it 
adopts RSS. So all websites should be interested in educating potential users about RSS technology, 
because increasing RSS-awareness among users will improve profits for them. When the critical RSS-
awareness level has been reached, however, the website’s profits will no longer be affected. As a result, it 
no longer makes sense to promote RSS technology. This may explain why, in recent years, RSS-
awareness among Internet users has increased slowly, though more websites now offer RSS feeds. 
My results also suggest that different types of websites are using RSS for different purposes—news 
portals and bloggers want RSS for increasing publicity, and ecommerce websites use RSS as a tool for 
improving profits. The finding that only when expected content-sales revenue per RSS visitor is high, 
RSS adoption will improve the adopting website’s profit, suggests that RSS feeds are most suited to 
websites that gain high content-sales revenue. E-commerce websites, which gain revenue mainly from 
selling commodities or providing online services, are likely to enjoy profit improvement from RSS use. In 
recent years, RSS feeds on e-commerce websites have been used mainly to update users about product 
arrivals, new deals, top sales, and so on, and the main purpose of RSS use for them is to build 
relationships with users, create purchase demand, and drive sales [3, 5, 41]. 
The situation for news portals and bloggers is different. Although RSS originated from these types of 
websites and has been widely adopted by them, my analysis shows that, for them, RSS may not deliver 
adequate content-sales revenue because most of these websites offer free online content. So these 
websites are expected to experience a profit reduction after RSS adoption. This conclusion is consistent 
with current practice, based on an increasing number of complaints from bloggers that their RSS feeds 
attract so much traffic load that it is difficult to monetize their sites [26]. 
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So, for what purpose do news portals and bloggers adopt RSS? The fact is that profitability is never their 
major goal. Instead, they care about nonmonetary objectives: increasing market size, getting public 
attention, and extending their brands [5].20 My analysis justifies their RSS adoption: afterward, the total 
number of visitors always increases and market size grows. (See Table 2.) In fact, lower profits after RSS 
adoption for news portals and bloggers have led publishers to explore the insertion of ads into RSS feeds, 
hoping their websites will be better monetized after RSS adoption [26].21. This validates my results. 
Discussion of Model and Limitations 
Although my model is simple, it captures the essential differences between the RSS push and 
conventional pull methods. Through it, I was able to derive interesting results and apply the findings to 
generate useful RSS adoption strategies for websites. I acknowledge that reality is more complex than the 
proposed model. It makes simplifying assumptions that I will discuss next. I will also check the 
robustness of my results when these assumptions are relaxed, and present potential avenues for future 
research. 
This work analyzes a two-stage sequential adoption game—website A makes the adoption decision first, 
and then website B, observing A’s choice, makes the decision afterward. In practice, such a decision-
making process happens on a long timeline. At any time, a website can adopt RSS and it is not limited to 
a two-stage setting. When moving from the two-stage to infinite-stage sequential setting, the equilibrium 
outcomes, stated in the Sequential Equilibrium Proposition (Proposition 5), are expected to change 
partially. The proposition states that when pR1 < pR < pR2, the equilibrium is <0,1>. This is the scenario 
when website A does not want to adopt before B due to the disadvantage of being the first adopter. 
Considering a many-stage decision process, the same logic will apply to website B: B does not want to 
adopt before A, and decides to wait as well. As a result, both websites will always wait, and <0,1> will 
not be equilibrium. Instead, it will lead to <0,0> equilibrium in the region of pR1 < pR < pR2. Meanwhile, 
the analyses and outcomes for pR < pR1 and pR > pR2 remain unchanged. 
In addition, my model assumes that the RSS program is able to block online advertisements effectively. 
RSS visitors do not contribute to website advertising revenue, as conventional visitors do. In reality, 
however, advertisers believe that the use of RSS should not be a threat to the online advertising 
community and are starting to explore the technological potential of RSS advertising [16, 21]. 
NYTimes.com, Google AdSense, CrispAds, Kanoodle, and Pheedo, have begun inserting targeted text 
advertisements in their syndication feeds. To incorporate this into my model, I assume that RSS visitors 
are also exposed to a certain number of simple text advertisements; each RSS visitor therefore contributes 
to the website’s advertising revenue by pad, where the current model setup is a special case of pad = 0. 
Now the revenue contribution per RSS visitor should be revised from pR to (pR + pad). Once using (pR + 
pad) to replace pR in all expressions and equations, I find that all derivation steps remain the same, as do 
lemmas and propositions. There are two consequences under such a revision. First, websites are more 
likely to adopt RSS, and in both sequential and simultaneous games, the region of equilibrium <1,1> 
enlarges. Second, the nondegeneration conditions are more difficult to satisfy, meaning that degeneration 
is more likely to happen with the presence of RSS advertising. Together, I conclude that adding 
advertisements to RSS feeds could be profit-improving for websites; yet if the volume of advertisements 
is not in balance with the volume of content, RSS advertising will cancel out RSS use. 
Finally, the current model assumes that different users gain different net values from web browsing x but 
the same value from consuming the specific targeted online content b. One possible extension is to 
assume that the latter value (b) is also heterogeneous among users. In the current solution, marginal users 
are characterized by x only (i.e., Equation (3) for Case <0,0>, Equations (4) and (5) for Case <1,0>, and 
Equations (10) and (11) for Case <1,1>). After revising this assumption, marginal users should be 
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determined by both x and b, and specifically, by the sum of these two values (x + b). As a consequence, to 
demonstrate the final market segmentation, I need a two-dimensional graph, with one dimension for the 
value of x and the other for b. There should be an indifference line defined by the value of (x + b) in this 
two-dimensional space. All users residing in that indifference line are marginal users. Other than this 
revision, all logic and math derivation steps remain unchanged. As a result, I expect the major 
conclusions will hold. 
Research on RSS could be conducted in other ways as well. For example, the current model considers two 
homogeneous competing websites. It would be interesting to examine whether similar conclusions could 
be drawn in the competition between two differentiated websites. In a heterogeneous duopoly setting, I 
can seek answers to research questions such as, “Is it true that only the cost-efficient website should adopt 
RSS?” or “Should only the website that gains heavy content-sales revenue offer RSS?” Also, my 
analytical results suggest that e-commerce websites are likely to be the main beneficiaries of RSS push 
technology. This theoretical prediction, however, currently has no empirical support. There are two 
reasons for this. First, use of RSS in e-commerce websites is in its early stages; data on the consequences 
of RSS use are scarce. Second, websites are cautious when publicizing their revenue and profit 
information. As time goes by, however, more data will become available, and therefore an empirical 
paper will be required to check the accuracy of theoretical predictions. People are just starting to explore 
the potential value of RSS in e-commerce. I expect more advanced RSS-featured business models to be 
developed and applied to the Internet in the future, which will deserve researchers’ attention. 
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Notes 
1. Many RSS readers and software applications are free—such as Feedly, NewsBlur, Digg, and The Old 
Reader—and numerous online manuals and video tutorials are available to assist users with setup, which 
usually takes only five to ten minutes. 
2. Push describes “anything from broadcasting to selective content delivery using sophisticated 
evolutionary filtering agents” [20 Kendall J., and Kendall, K. Information delivery systems: An 
exploration of Web PULL and PUSH technologies. Communications of the AIS, 1 (1999), Article 
14. [Google Scholar]]. 
3. For example, NYTimes.com lists its free RSS feeds online 
(www.nytimes.com/services/xml/rss/index.html). These feeds include news headlines, summaries, and 
links to the nytimes.com site for full articles. 
4. For example, the New York Times reported that its RSS feeds generated 5.9 million page views in 
March 2005, which represented a 342 percent increase over the previous year and a 39 percent increase 
over the previous month [40 The New York Times Company reports NYTimes.com’s record-breaking 
traffic. New York Times Company News Release, April 2006. 
www.thefreelibrary.com/The+New+York+ Times+ Company+Reports+NYTimes.com’s+Record-
Breaking...-a0131620245/. [Google Scholar]]. And Yahoo! News reported that adding RSS feeds to My 
Yahoo! attracted 26 million additional visitors in one month. 
5. Weekly RSS usage rate for the same period was roughly 4–7 percent, which actually shows a slightly 
decreasing trend. See blogs.forrester.com/reineke_reitsma/13-03-15-the_data_digest_usage_of_rss_feeds. 
6. This concept is similar to, though not exactly the same as what Stahl [38 Stahl, D.O. Oligopolistic 
pricing with sequential consumer search. American Economic Review, 79, 4 (1989), 700–712.[Web of 
Science ®], [Google Scholar]] proposed. He argued that users have different attitudes toward shopping. 
Some derive enjoyment purely from shopping itself, while others do not. 
7. Advertising revenue support is critical to monetize websites [25 Lin, M.; Ke, X.; and Whinston, A.B. 
Vertical differentiation and a comparison of online advertising models. Journal of Management 
Information Systems, 29, 1 (Summer 2012), 195–236.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science 
®], [Google Scholar]]. In practice, multiple pricing models exist for online ads, such as charges per 
impression or by click-through rate. I assume that online ads lead to disutility for users. As long as this 
assumption holds, all analyses and results remain valid. 
8. Most RSS software can block online ads. Although there has been debate about adding ads to RSS 
feeds, this is not common. 
9. A common business model for websites is to sell some product, experience, content, or service and 
earn revenues from the sale [4 Clemons, E.K. Business models for monetizing Internet applications and 
web sites: Experience, theory, and predictions. Journal of Management Information Systems, 26, 2 (Fall 
2009), 15–41.[Taylor & Francis Online], [Web of Science ®], [Google Scholar]], all of which are 
considered content-sales revenue in this work. 
10. This research sets all else equal for the two competing websites but allows choice of content delivery 
method, so that the analysis could be focused on the impact of RSS adoption. 
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11. Otherwise, some users will switch from the higher traffic website to the lower traffic website until 
equivalence is reached. 
12. The two websites have different numbers of visitors but the same amount of effective traffic. 
Otherwise, some conventional users will switch from the website with higher traffic load to the website 
with lower traffic load until equivalence is reached. 
13. Otherwise, more users will use RSS feeds to visit website A until there is no positive utility left for 
RSS visits. 
14. This situation will be analyzed separately later in the study. 
15. If the nondegeneration condition does not hold, Case <1,0> and Case <1,1> are the same as Case 
<0,0>. No one will use RSS even if it is offered. If the critical awareness condition does not hold, the 
outcomes described in Propositions 2 and 3 are no longer valid. This will be analyzed separately later in 
the study. In addition, it is worthwhile to point out that the nondegeneration condition in Case <1,1> is 
more demanding than that in Case <1,0>, so I only need require that the nondegeneration condition in 
Case <1,1> hold. The two critical awareness conditions are the same in Case <1,0> and Case <1,1>. 
16. In addition to RSS adoption, websites can use other strategies to further optimize profits, such as 
adjusting the prices of their online products and services, varying specific content coverage, or charging 
to subscribe to RSS feeds. These potential profit-improving strategies are not within the scope of this 
research; in this context, the only decision for a website is whether to adopt RSS. This lets me focus on 
the main research goal: how the RSS adoption decision affects a website’s profitability. 
17. They are the same values as in the Sequential Equilibrium Proposition (Proposition 5). 
18. This corresponds to the range of pR ∈ [pR1, pR2]. 
19. In this example, the nondegeneration conditions require pR ∈ [1.3, 2.6], and the two threshold values 
are pR1 = 1.6 and pR2 = 2. 
20. These sites prefer RSS for content distribution also because of their narrow information coverage and 
unstable update periods. 
21. Most RSS ads now are just a few lines of text, differing in color from the headlines and summaries 
inside the RSS readers [28 Morrissey, B. RSS feeds becoming hot real estate for online Ads. ADWEEK 
Report, June 2005. www.adweek.com/news/advertising/rss-feeds-becoming-hot-real-estate-online-ads-
79904/. [Google Scholar]]. 
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Appendix. Proofs of The Main Results
A. Proof for Proposition 2 (One RSS Market Proposition). From Equation 8, I
get ρA
<1,0≥ (b – pR)/w. Plugging this into Equation 5, I get x
<1,0>
RSS-unaware = S + pC –
pR. Also, Equation 4 gives x
<1,0>
RSS-aware = S + pC – pR = x
<1,0>
RSS-unaware. So the
marginal user, among the RSS-aware and RSS-unaware user group, is the same. I
denote this by x<1,0>. Now plugging the above expressions of traffic load and the
marginal user into Equations 6 and 7, I get r ¼ 1 bpRw aSpCþ pRð Þ . In addition,
Equation 7 suggests that N<1;0>R ¼ r Sþ pCpRð Þθ  bþ pRþ arwwθ Next, I plug in r,
NR
<1,0>, and x<1,0>RSS-aware into the boundary condition in Equation 9 and get
S  bþ pR þ arwwr  pC þ pR; β  w Sþ pCpRað Þþ2 bpRð Þwθ Sþ pCpRð Þ :
Finally, using Equation 1, the difference of website A’s and B’s profit can be
written as:
π<1;0>A  π<1;0>B ¼ Aþ pCð Þ N<1;0>C;A  N<1;0>C;B
 
þ N<1;0>R;A  pR> 0, pR>
Aþ pCð Þ N<1;0>C;A N<1;0>C;Bð Þ
N<1;0>R;A
; pR. Since ρ
<1;0>
A ¼ N<1;0>C;A þ θ  N<1;0>R;A ¼ ρ<1;0>B ¼ N<1;0>C;B ,
I have N<1;0>C;A  N<1;0>C;B ¼ θ  N<1;0>R;A : As a result, pR ¼ θ  pC þ Að Þ:
B. Proof of Proposition 3 (Both RSSs Market Proposition). Equation 14 gives
ρi
<1,1> = (b – pR)/w. Plugging this into Equation 11, I get x
<1,1>
RSS-unaware = S + pC –
pR. Also, Equation 10 gives x
<1,1>
RSS-aware = S + pC – pR = x
<1,1>
unaware. So the
marginal user, among the RSS-aware and RSS-unaware user group, is the same. To
simplify, I denote it by just x<1,1>. Plugging the expressions of x<1,1>, ρi
<1,1>, and
r1 = r2 = 0.5 (since it is for a symmetric equilibrium) into Equations 12 or 13 yields
N<1;1>R ¼ Sþ pCpRð Þθ  2bþ 2pR þ awwθ : The boundary condition in Equation 15 thus
becomes S  bþ pRþ aw=2w=2  pC þ pR and β  w Sþ pCpRað Þþ 2 bpRð Þwθ Sþ pCpRð Þ : Finally, I
plug x<1,1>, NR
<1,1> and ρi
<1,1> into Equation 1 to get the website’s profit.
The above is for a symmetric equilibrium in Case <1,1> since it uses r1 = r2 = 0.5
in the derivation. An asymmetric equilibrium may exist in this case. In an asym-
metric equilibrium, the expressions of marginal visitor and effective traffic load
remain the same as in a symmetric equilibrium, and also the same boundary
conditions apply. The value of NR
<1,0> and r1 and r2, however, should be rederived.
Using Equations 12 and 14 I obtain N<1;1>R ¼ r1 aSþ pCpRð Þθr2 þ
bpR
wθr2
: By further
plugging this expression into ρA
<1,1> ρB
<1,1>, and then using Equations 12 and 13,
I get 4r1r2r1r22r21 ¼
bpR
w aSpCþpRð Þ : That is, in any asymmetric equilibrium, the pair
{r1r2} must satisfy this relationship.
C. Proof of Lemma 1 (Comparison Results for Website Traffic). (1)
ρ<1;0>A ¼ ρ<1;0>B ¼ ρ<1;1>i ¼ bpw , and ρ<0;0>i <ρ<1;0>A when the nondegeneration condi-
tion holds. (2) First I prove that N<1;1>i < N
<1;0>
A . Note that x
<1;1>
i ¼ x<1;0>A . It means,
from Case <1,0> to Case <1,1>, some RSS visitors switch to website B, so
N<1;1>R;A <N
<1;0>
R;A , and meanwhile some conventional visitors switch to website A:
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N<1;1>C;A >N
<1;0>
C;A . Since ρ
<1;1>
i ¼ ρ<1;0>A , it must be the case that, for website A, the
increase of conventional visitors is less than the decrease of RSS visitors. Therefore,
the total number of visitors to website A decreases: N<1;1>i < N
<1;0>
A . Also,
N<1;1>i >N
<1;0>
B under the nondegeneration condition, and
N<0;0>i ¼ ρ<0;0>i <ρ<1;0>B ¼ N<1;0>B . (3) From x<1,1> x<1,0> > x<0,0> and r < 0.5, it is
easy to get N<1;0>C;A <N
<1;1>
C;i < N
<0;0>
C;i . To see N
<0;0>
C;i < N
<1;0>
C;B , note that
N<0;0>C;i ¼ N<0;0>i ;N<1;0>C;B ¼ N<1;0>B , and N<0;0>i <N<1;0>B as shown in (2) above.
D. Proof of Proposition 4 (Benefits of RSS Proposition). (1) The impact of first
RSS adoption—from Case <0,0> to Case <1,0>. Consider the impact on the adopting
website A. Let ΔπA ¼ π<1;0>A  π<1;0>A ;ΔNC;A ¼ N<1;0>C;A  N<0;0>C;A and ΔρA ¼
ρ<1;0>A  ρ<0;0>A be the changes in the profit, number of conventional visitors, and
effective traffic load of website A, respectively. Website A’s profit change can be
written as ΔπA ¼ Aþ pCð Þ  ΔNC;A þ N<1;0>R;A  pR  ΔρA  c. As shown in Lemma 1,
ΔNC;A < 0, and ΔρA > 0. Set ΔπA ¼ 0, I get pR ¼ ΔNC;A Aþ pCð ÞþΔρA cN<1;0>R;A > 0: Therefore,
the quadratic function ΔπA pCð Þ ¼ 0 always has positive solutions. Further note that
ΔπA pR ¼ 0ð Þ< 0 . There must be a positive solution pR1 such that (i) ΔπA p1R
  ¼ 0,
(ii) "p< p1R;ΔπA pð Þ< 0, and (iii) "p> p1R;ΔπA pð Þ> 0 . So, the profit of the adopting
website (website A) will increase after first RSS adoption if and only if pR > pR
1, and
will decrease afterward if and only if pR < pR
1.
Also consider the impact on the competing website B. Similarly, I have ΔNC;B ¼
N<1;0>C;B  N<0;0>C;B > 0 and ΔρB ¼ ρ<1;0>B  ρ<0;0>B > 0 from Lemma 1, ΔπB ¼ π<1;0>B 
π<0;0>B ¼ Aþ pCð Þ  ΔNC;B  ΔρB  c: Note that ΔNC;B ¼ ΔNB ¼ ΔρB, so
ΔπB ¼ Aþ pC  cð Þ  ΔρB > 0. Thus, the competing website’s profit always
increases after the first RSS adoption.
(2) The impact of second RSS adoption—from Case <1,0> to Case <1,1>.
Consider the impact on the adopting website B. Similarly, I define ΔNC;B ¼
N<1;1>C;B  N<1;0>C;B ;ΔNR;B ¼ N<1;1>R;B  N<1;0>R;B and ΔρB ¼ ρ<1;1>B  ρ<1;0>B . The profit
change of website B can then be written as ΔπB ¼ π<1;1>B  π<1;0>B ¼ Aþ pCð Þ 
ΔNC;B þ ΔNR;B  pR  ΔρB  c: Lemma 1 states that ΔNC;B < 0;ΔNR;B > 0, and
ΔρB ¼ 0. By setting ΔπB ¼ 0, I get pR ¼ ΔNC;B AþpCð ÞΔNR;B ;P2R > 0 Since
ρ<1;0>B ¼ ρ<1;1>B , the decrease in the number of conventional visitors will just
be equal to the increase in the number of RSS visitors multiplied by
θ: N<1;1>C;B  N<1;0>C;B ¼ θ  ΔNR;B. So, p2R ¼ θ Aþ pCð Þ. As a result, profit of
website B increases (decreases) after second RSS adoption if and only if pR > pR
2
(pR < pR
2).
Also consider the impact on the competing website A. Note that
ΔπA ¼ π<1;1>A  π<1;0>A ¼ ΔNC;A  pC þ Að Þ þ ΔNR;A  pR  ΔpB  c, and ΔNC;A > 0;
ΔNR;A < 0; pA ¼ 0. At p2R ¼ θ  Aþ pCð Þ: ΔπA ¼ pC þ Að Þ: ΔNC;Aþ

ΔNR;AθÞ. In
addition, ΔNC;A ¼ ΔNR;Aθ. As a result, ΔπA P2R
  ¼ 0. To conclude, I find that
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profit of website A increases (decreases) after second RSS adoption if and only if pR
< pR
2 (pR > pR
2).
Finally, I still need to show pR
1 < pR
2 = pR*, where pR* is given by Proposition 2.
Since pR
2 = θ (A + pC) = pR*, it is obvious that these two values are the same. Next I
prove pR
1 < pR
2. One unit of traffic load can “carry” one conventional visitor or 1/θ
RSS visitors. From Case <0,0> to Case <1,0>, for website A, the decrease in the
number of conventional visitors is ΔNC;A ¼ N<1;0>C;A  N<0;0>C;A < 0. So if the traffic
load remains unchanged, the increase in the number of RSS visitors should be
ΔNC;A
θ . However, the traffic load of website A in fact increases, and so the increase
in the number of RSS visitors is ΔNR;A> ΔNC;Aθ . Denote it by
ΔNR;A ¼  1Θ  ΔNC;A > 1θ  ΔNC;A, where 0<Θ< θ. Substituting it to the expres-
sion of pR
1, I get p1R ¼ Aþ pCð Þ  Θþ θ Θð Þ  c. Comparing it with
p2R ¼ θ  Aþ pCð Þ, it is easy to see that pR1 < pR2.
E. Proof of Proposition 5 (Sequential Equilibrium Proposition). When website
A makes a decision before website B, I need to first analyze B’s best response given
A’s action. If website A adopts, the best response of B is to adopt iff pR > pR
2; and
not to adopt iff pR < pR
2. If website A does not adopt, the best response of B is to
adopt iff pR > pR
1; and not to adopt iff pR < pR
1.
Next I analyze A’s decision, given B’s best response as stated above. Also note
that pR
1 < pR
2. When pR > pR
2, website B’s response is always to adopt. So website
A needs to compare π<0;1>A (if it adopts) and π
<1;1>
A (if it does not adopt). I have
shown that pR > pR2 ! π<1;1>A > π<0;1>A in Proposition 4. So website A will adopt. In
this case, the sequential equilibrium will be <1,1>.
When pR < pR
1, website B’s response is always not to adopt. So website A needs
to compare π<0;1>A (if it adopts) and π
<0;0>
A (if it does not adopt). I have shown that
pR < pR1 ! π<1;0>A <π<0;0>A in Proposition 4. So website A will not adopt. In this case,
the sequential equilibrium will be <0,0>.
When pR
1 < pR < pR
2, website B’s response is to adopt if A does not adopt, and not
to adopt if A adopts. So website A needs to compare π<1;0>A (if it adopts) and π
<0;1>
A
(if it does not adopt). I have shown that pR < pR ! π<1;0>A < π<0;1>A in Proposition 2
and pR
2 = pR* in Proposition 4. So website A will not adopt. In this case, the
sequential equilibrium will be <0,1>.
F. Proof for Proposition 6 (Simultaneous Equilibrium Proposition). For <0,0>
to be an equilibrium, each website must have no incentive to adopt RSS, given the
competitor does not adopt, namely, π<0;0>A > π
<1;0>
A and π
<0;0>
B > π
<0;1>
B . Due to the
symmetry, I only need to prove π<0;0>A > π
<1;0>
A . The proof of Proposition 4 has shown
that π<0;0>A > π
<1;0>
A , PR <P1R:
For <1,1> to be an equilibrium, each website must have incentive to adopt RSS,
given the competitor chooses to adopt, namely, π<1;1>A > π
<0;1>
A and π
<1;1>
B > π
<1;0>
B .
Similarly, I only need to prove π<1;1>B > π
<1;0>
B . The proof of Proposition 4 has shown
that π<1;1>B > π
<1;0>
B , PR <P2R:
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For <1,0> to be an equilibrium, website A must have incentive to adopt RSS,
given B does not adopt, namely, π<1;0>A > π
<0;0>
A ; and website B must have no
incentive to adopt RSS, given A has adopted, namely, π<1;0>B > π
<1;1>
B . The proof of
Proposition 4 has shown that it means P1R <PR <P
2
R . The same analysis and finding
also apply to the equilibrium <0,1>.
G. Proof of Proposition 7 (Benefits of RSS Proposition).Taking Case <0,0>
as the benchmark, I need to prove that in outcomes <1,0>, <0,1> and <1,1>, when
they are equilibrium, both websites are better off. That is to say, I need to prove that
in each of the above equilibriums, each website’s profit is greater than πi
<0,0>, i = A
or B.
Consider the outcome <0,1>. It is an equilibrium when pR
1 < pR < pR
2, in both
sequential and simultaneous games. For website A, it gets the profit πA
<0,1>, and
Table 2 states that πA
<0,1> > πA
<0,0>: as the competing website, A always becomes
better off after first RSS adoption. For website B, it gets the profit πB
<0,1>, and
Table 2 states that πB
<0,1> > πB
<0,0> when pR > pR
1: as the adopting website, B
becomes better off after first RSS adoption only if pR > pR
1. Thus, in this equili-
brium, both websites benefit from the RSS technology. In addition, πA
<0,1> > πB
<0,1>
because pR < pR
2 = pR*—Proposition 2 suggests that the RSS nonadopter gains a
higher profit than the adopter in the competition when pR < pR*.
Next, consider the outcome <1,0>. It is an equilibrium when pR
1 < pR < pR
2 in the
simultaneous game. The exact same analysis could be applied, and the same con-
clusion is reached: in this equilibrium, both websites gain higher profits than in the
benchmark, and thus benefit from the RSS technology.
Finally, consider the equilibrium <1,1>. It holds when pR > pR
2 in both sequential
and simultaneous games. For website A, it gets the profit πA
<1,1>, and πA
<1,1> >
πA
<0,1> > πA
<0,0>. The first inequality holds because from Case <0,1> to Case <1,1>,
website A, as the adopting website, gets a higher profit after second RSS adoption
when pR > pR
2 (see Table 2); and the second inequality holds because from Case
<0,0> to Case <0,1>, website A, as the competing website, gets a higher profit
always after first RSS adoption (see Table 2). Since πA
<1,1> = πB
<1,1> and πA
<0,0> =
πB
<0,0>, I also have πB
<1,1> > πB
<0,0>. To conclude, in this equilibrium, both websites
benefit from the RSS technology too.
H. Lemma 2 and its proof
Lemma 2. When β is small, in both Case <1,0> and Case <1,1>, the marginal user
who is aware of RSS, x<1,0>RSS-aware and x
<1,1>
RSS-aware, remain the same, but the
marginal user who is unaware of RSS, x<1,0>RSS-unaware and x
<1,1>
RSS-unaware, become
smaller.
Proof of Lemma 2. First consider Case <1,0>. The two traffic load Equations 6
and 7 still hold. Among users who are unaware of RSS, shown in Figure 2b, the
marginal user x<1,0>RSS-unaware is given by Equation 5. Among users who are aware
of RSS, shown in Figure 2a, the marginal user x<1,0>RSS-aware is given by Equation 4
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and x<1,0>RSS-aware = S + pC – pR. But Equation 9 is binding, suggesting that NR
<1,0>
= β · x<1,0>RSS-aware and that Equation 8 does not hold. It is easy to see that now
x<1,0>RSS-aware ≠ x
<1,0>
RSS-unaware anymore. Inserting Equation 4 and the binding
boundary condition NR<1;0> ¼ β  x<1;0>RSS-aware into Equations 6 and 7, I
get 1 2rð Þ 1 βð Þ x<1;0>RSSunaware ¼ 1 2rð Þa βðS þ pC  pRÞð1 2r þ θÞ;
and inserting Equation 7 into Equation 5, I get 1þ wr 1 βð Þð Þx<1;0>RSSunaware
¼ bþ pC þ S þ wraþ wβðS þ pC  pRÞðθ rÞ. These are two equations with
two unknowns (x<1,0>RSS-unaware and r) and can be solved. The solution is:
r ¼ 1βð Þf bpCSð Þþagβ SþpCpRð Þ wθ 1βð Þþ1þθf g2 1βð Þ bpCSð Þþaf gβ SþpCpRð Þ wθ 1βð Þþ2f g . Plugging the solution of r, I obtain
x<1,0>RSS-unaware. And the website’s profit can be obtained accordingly.
Now consider Case <1,1>. Using the same logic and using the binding boundary
condition NR
<1,1≥ β · x<1,1>RSS-aware, I get: x
<1,1>
RSS-aware = S + pC – pR and
x<1;1>RSS-unaware ¼ bþpCþSþw a βθð Þ SþpCpRð Þf g1þw 1βð Þ , and x<1,1>RSS-aware ≠ x<1,1>RSS-unaware.
And the expression for website’s profit can be obtained accordingly.
NOTES
1. Many RSS readers and software applications are free—such as Feedly, NewsBlur, Digg,
and The Old Reader—and numerous online manuals and video tutorials are available to assist
users with setup, which usually takes only five to ten minutes.
2. Push describes “anything from broadcasting to selective content delivery using sophis-
ticated evolutionary filtering agents” [20].
3. For example, NYTimes.com lists its free RSS feeds online (www.nytimes.com/services/
xml/rss/index.html). These feeds include news headlines, summaries, and links to the nytimes.
com site for full articles.
4. For example, the New York Times reported that its RSS feeds generated 5.9 million page
views in March 2005, which represented a 342 percent increase over the previous year and a
39 percent increase over the previous month [40]. And Yahoo! News reported that adding RSS
feeds to My Yahoo! attracted 26 million additional visitors in one month.
5. Weekly RSS usage rate for the same period was roughly 4–7 percent, which actually
shows a slightly decreasing trend. See blogs.forrester.com/reineke_reitsma/13-03-15-
the_data_digest_usage_of_rss_feeds.
6. This concept is similar to, though not exactly the same as what Stahl [38] proposed. He
argued that users have different attitudes toward shopping. Some derive enjoyment purely
from shopping itself, while others do not.
7. Advertising revenue support is critical to monetize websites [25]. In practice, multiple
pricing models exist for online ads, such as charges per impression or by click-through rate. I
assume that online ads lead to disutility for users. As long as this assumption holds, all
analyses and results remain valid.
8. Most RSS software can block online ads. Although there has been debate about adding
ads to RSS feeds, this is not common.
9. A common business model for websites is to sell some product, experience, content, or
service and earn revenues from the sale [4], all of which are considered content-sales revenue
in this work.
10. This research sets all else equal for the two competing websites but allows choice of
content delivery method, so that the analysis could be focused on the impact of RSS adoption.
11. Otherwise, some users will switch from the higher traffic website to the lower traffic
website until equivalence is reached.
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